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1. Introduction and background
I am honored to be here this evening to make this presentation on the implications of accounting
research for financial reporting standard setting, as part of the Emanuel Saxe Lecture Series. This
lecture series honors Emanuel Saxe, who served Baruch College for many years as professor,
department chair, University Distinguished Professor and dean. In preparation for this presentation, I
researched the Emanuel Saxe Lectures, and learned that their purpose is to provide discussions of topics
of critical interest to the study and practice of accounting. This is an expansive purpose, and as you can
imagine, past presenters have covered a wide variety of issues. There have been presentations on
taxation, auditing, fair value accounting, inflation, litigation, and regulation.
Most pertinent to my topic this evening, there have also been some presentations on accounting
research, specifically the value of accounting research and its relation to financial reporting standards.
Three presentations explicitly considered whether accounting research is of any practical value, or,
more specifically, whether accounting research is of any value to financial reporting standard setting. In
1979 George Sorter spoke with despair about the inanity of accounting research and its utter uselessness
for any practical purpose, let alone its implications for standard setting. In 1982, Robert Jensen
described and deplored the increasing gap between academic and practitioner research in accounting
and expressed dismay over the shoddiness of academic research in general. In 1983 Ross Watts
described the evolution of empirical research in accounting, with significant emphasis on his views

about political costs and contracting costs. My topic is related to these three presentations in that I will
consider what are the standard setting inferences that can be drawn from accounting research.
1.1 Previous Emanuel Saxe Lectures on accounting standards and regulation
Shifting now from accounting research to accounting standards and the standard setting process, I note
that several previous Emanuel Saxe Lectures have focused on accounting standards and regulation, with
implications for issues facing us today. Some of these presentations have taken strong positions. For
example, in 1974 George Benston argued the case against required financial reporting and disclosure,
and against government regulation of securities markets. He argued that various market forces should be
permitted to operate to produce the levels of financial disclosure desired by market participants. In 1978
the Emanuel Saxe presentation featured Abraham Briloff and Robert Anthony debating both what
should be the characteristics and mandate of a standard setting organization and what should be the
nature of financial reporting standards. One important element of the context of this debate was the
hearings, led by then-Senator Metcalf, about the proper role of government regulation in accounting,
including regulation of the accounting profession and financial reporting standard setting. This, of
course, is a debate that has resurfaced in 2002.
In 1979, William Baxter discussed the historical evolution of accounting standards, which he says were
almost unknown before World War II. In his description of standards, which I emphasize dates from
1979, he says:
"Now [the financial reporting standards] dominate the accountant's work. They already fill
volumes; and fresh ones keep pouring forth with no sign of the stream drying up. They are
to be found in many lands; and national standards are being topped up with ... international
standards."
I expect that had I not told you the date, you might have thought the description of voluminous
reporting standards that dominate the work of accounting came from a very recent presentation.
In 1996, Robert Swieringa used this presentation to describe the 37 standards he had helped shape in his
10.5 years as a Board member at the FASB. Despite his background as an accounting professor, Mr.
Swieringa did not refer to academic research at all in his presentation, although he did mention
something I will also discuss: the increasing use of estimates in financial reporting.
Finally, Donald Kirk presented the 35th Emanuel Saxe Lecture in 1984, when he was chairman of the
FASB. His presentation concerned expectations about professionalism in financial reporting, standard
setting, and public accounting. He spoke in 1984 about a recent meeting of the FASB's Financial
Accounting Standards Advisory Council [FASAC] in which a major topic of discussion was "what
some observers see as a tendency to bypass the intent of accounting standards." He listed four questions
discussed at the FASAC meeting; summaries of three of those four questions follow:
1. Do preparers seek innovative transactions or interpretations that are designed to observe the 'letter' of
an accounting standard but not its 'spirit' -- and to what extent does this bring them into a matching of
wits with auditors?
2. Does heightened competition among CPA firms encourage a search for ways around the spirit of
accounting standards?
3. How does the professionalism issue relate to the question of specific versus broad standards?
Mr. Kirk also pointed to several recent events-recent as of 1984 -- including: a re-examination by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA] of its self-regulation, criticism of the
FASB for creating too many standards, criticism of the FASB for not providing more timely guidance,

SEC concerns about the quality of financial reporting, and Congressional concerns about the adequacy
of the SEC's oversight of standard setting.
One important element of Mr. Kirk's presentation-in 1984-was a discussion of criticisms that the FASB
creates "too many standards, the standards are too detailed, complex and inflexible." In speaking of the
basis for this criticism, and of what I will call the demand for detail and the FASB's response to such
demands, he quoted from two comment letters from the same organization, written about 18 months
apart, on two distinct issues. The 1983 comment letter quoted by Mr. Kirk advocated broad principlesbased standards. The 1984 comment letter, from the same organization, advocated detailed
implementation guidance. Mr. Kirk also quoted from a 1974 communication to the FASB from the
president of the AICPA, speaking of "the need to deal swiftly with the relatively narrow accounting and
reporting problems that are frequently encountered in daily practice.... It was the consensus of the
[AICPA] Board ... that the FASB should be strongly urged to take whatever steps might be necessary to
provide timely guidance to practitioners on emerging problems."
I think these examples make it clear that concerns about accounting research and the standard setting
process, sometimes considered separately and sometimes considered together, have figured prominently
in this series of presentations since 1973. There have been recurring debates about the legitimacy of the
FASB, about private sector standard setting, about the desirability of broad principles-based standards
versus detailed rules- based standards, and about the proper role-if there is a role-of accounting research
in the standard setting process.
1.2 Summary of this Emanuel Saxe Lecture
My contribution to this series of discussions is to present my views about where and how various types
of accounting research can inform the standard-setting process, and about the limitations on what can be
inferred, for standard-setting purposes, from research. I want to begin with an overview of what I will
talk about and describe the perspective that I will be taking in this presentation. By way of background,
I'll give a few examples of the kinds of decisions that a standard setter (the FASB) makes. Having laid
that groundwork, I'll review the framework that is to be used by the FASB to make standard-setting
decisions, namely the Conceptual Framework, as laid out in the Statements of Financial Accounting
Concepts.
The main part of my presentation will address a single issue, in various ways, and from various distinct
perspectives. That issue can be stated at least two ways :
1. Viewing standard setting from the perspective of accounting research, do accounting researchers use
the Conceptual Framework to identify research questions and to choose research designs? Do research
results provide any insights that can help the Board apply the Conceptual Framework to standard-setting
issues? If researchers can provide some insights, what are the limits?
2. Viewing accounting research from the perspective of the FASB, why doesn't the Board seem to pay
much attention to the results of accounting research? Is this appearance of inattention to research just
that, an appearance, while the reality is the FASB in fact pays substantial attention to research? Are the
insights that can be gleaned by standard setters from research so limited that attempting to apply
research to standard-setting issues is just not worth the effort?
In order to address this issue, I'll describe the kinds of questions research can and does answer and
calibrate both those questions and the answers provided by accounting research against the issues faced
by the FASB. In doing so, I hope to focus on both the kinds of insights that can be derived from
research and the limitations of those insights.

2. Standard-setting decisions

Speaking now to the kinds of decisions a standard setter (the FASB) makes, at one extreme are
relatively broad issues that may involve not only developing a new standard but also revisiting and
extending concepts.
2.1 Accounting for liabilities and equities
One example of such a broad issue is the accounting for liabilities and equities. The FASB issued an
Exposure Draft of a standard and of a proposed amendment to Concepts Statement 6, in October 2000.
Comment letters have been received, there has been a roundtable discussion, and redeliberations are
proceeding.
The proposed amendment to Concepts Statement 6 involves changing the accounting definition of
liability. The current liability definition refers to an obligation to transfer assets or provide services.
Both practice and the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) have treated as equity all obligations that can
be settled in shares-whether fixed in number of shares or fixed in dollar value of shares. (2)
The proposed amendment to Concepts Statement 6 would have the effect of characterizing as liabilities
arrangements in which an obligation is to be settled by transferring a fixed dollar value of shares. The
reasoning is as follows: if obligations that can or must be settled in shares establish a relationship that is
not an owner relationship, then the instrument that establishes the relationship is a liability. The
amendment goes on to explain the attributes of an owner relationship-mainly that the value of whatever
is conveyed goes up and down with share values. If the amendment is adopted, then the scope of
liabilities will have increased to include certain types of obligations that are settled in shares-a major
shift in thinking.
This conceptual issue has broad implications, in that the concepts of assets and liabilities are the
building blocks of the other reporting elements, for example, revenues and expenses. That is, the
definitions of revenues and expenses are based on the definitions of assets and liabilities-it's not possible
to have either revenue or expense without a change in either or both assets and liabilities. Therefore,
when the definition of liability is changed, to encompass more kinds of share-settled obligations, it is
possible that other changes in accounting practice will follow.
In addition to the conceptual issue just discussed, the liabilities and equities project also contains a
broad standard-setting issue, namely, accounting for single instruments, or single arrangements, with
two or more heterogeneous components. The specific issue addressed in the exposure draft on liabilities
and equities is how best to represent and measure financial instruments that are compound, in the sense
that they have characteristics of both liabilities and equities.
Examples of such compound instruments include (but are not limited to) convertible debt, which
contains both debt components and equity components. The issue of accounting for convertible debt
dates back at least to Accounting Principles Board [APB] Opinion 14, issued in 1969. The Discussion
section of APB Opinion 14 lays out the case for and against separate accounting recognition of the debt
and equity components of convertible debt, and concludes that separate recognition for the conversion
feature in convertible debt will not be permitted. One key element of Opinion 14 [paragraph 8] is that
separate reporting of the debt and equity components presents intractable measurement problems.
Interestingly, the dissent to Opinion 14 lays out many of the same arguments that support the separate
reporting approach proposed in the FASB's October 2000 exposure draft.(3) The words used in the
dissent are that the failure to provide for separate recognition of components belies economic reality.
Today, using language from the FASB's Conceptual Framework, I would say that the failure to
recognize separate debt and equity components impairs representational faithfulness. In the interests of
representational faithfulness, the proposed approach in the exposure draft would require separate
recognition of components of compound instruments.

I use this example to illustrate a broad and pervasive reporting issue, one that was addressed over 30
years ago by the APB and is now being revisited by the FASB, armed with the tools of the Conceptual
Framework and advances in measurement techniques. Those measurement techniques, which include
several versions of option pricing models, are derived from academic research.
2.2 Accounting for revenues and related liabilities
A second example of a broad issue facing the FASB is accounting for revenues and related liabilities.
Although revenues are for most business enterprises the largest single item in the income statement,
there is no general financial reporting standard on revenue recognition in U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles [GAAP]. What guidance does exist takes one of two forms. The first form is
various industry-specific or transaction-specific pieces of authoritative guidance, which tends to be
detailed and narrow. The SEC's Staff Accounting Bulletin [SAB]101, which builds on Accounting
Standards Executive Committee [AcSEC] Statement of Position [SOP] 97-2, Software Revenue
Recognition, provides an example of this type of guidance. Specifically, SAB 101 provides guidance
which generalizes from an industry-specific approach and considers a number of narrow facts-andcircumstances reporting situations.
The second form of guidance on revenue recognition appears in the FASB's Conceptual Framework. In
addition to ignoring the practical details of actual transactions, this guidance also presents a conceptual
issue. Specifically, Concepts Statement 6 defines revenues in terms of changes in assets and liabilities,
consistent with the overall Conceptual Framework approach which considers assets and liabilities
fundamental. But Concepts Statement 5 adds additional revenue recognition criteria which do not
necessarily conform with the assets and liabilities based definitions. For example, Concepts Statement 5
adds the earned criterion which requires that the entity must have "substantially accomplished" what it
is required to do in order to be entitled to benefits in the form of revenues. This criterion has in some
cases given rise to conflicts with the definition of a liability, with the result that recognition criteria tied
to the concept of "earnings process" override the liability concept and the enterprise records a deferred
revenue account that does not meet the definition of a liability.
The broad issues facing the FASB here are: should Concepts Statements 5 and 6 [SFAC 5 and SFAC 6]
be revised to be internally consistent, and if so, how? What should be the principles that govern revenue
recognition? These issues touch the definitions of both revenues and liabilities and may even require
reconsideration of other concepts and definitions.(4)
2.3 Examples of relatively narrow standard-setting issues
Moving now away from examples of broad issues, at the other end of the spectrum are relatively narrow
issues-some of which may have broad implications. The FASB and the Emerging Issues Task Force
[EITF] are presented with dozens of such issues. I will illustrate this point with two examples. The first
example pertains to accounting procedures in purchase business combinations and the second example
pertains to loan commitments.
As part of the FASB's project on purchase business combinations procedures, the Board has adopted the
principle of measuring assets and liabilities acquired in a business combination at their fair values.(5)
This principle sounds straightforward, until we encounter contingent liabilities of the acquired entity
which are not measured at fair value under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 5 [SFAS 5]. If
we apply fair value measurements to contingent liabilities of the acquired entity at the acquisition date,
what should be the subsequent accounting? Should we revert to SFAS 5 accounting after initial
recognition and measurement? What about the measurement inconsistency between acquired contingent
liabilities -- to be initially measured at fair value -- and existing contingent liabilities of the acquirer,
which are recognized and measured under SFAS 5?

On the one hand, this issue may be seen as narrow, pertaining only to procedures to be followed in the
accounting for business combinations. On the other hand, the issue has broad implications, because it
illustrates the conflict between SFAS 5 and Concepts Statement 7. In light of the commitment on the
part of at least some Board members to moving toward fair value measurements, I predict that the
conflict will often be resolved in favor of fair value measurements, with the implication that pressure
will build for a reconsideration of SFAS 5.
A second example of a narrow issue is the accounting for loan commitments, which are agreements by
financial institutions to make loans of various types, ranging from home mortgages to commercial paper
backups. SFAS 65 and SFAS 91 require a cost-type approach in which, roughly speaking, loan
commitments are recorded in terms of the fees received, and income is recognized either when the
commitment expires or over the life of the loan. However, some loan commitments seem to meet the
definition of a derivative, for which the accounting in SFAS 133 requires a fair value measurement. For
loan commitments which are derivatives, the issue represents a conflict in the literature-which
measurement approach should be followed for loan commitments? More broadly, for loan commitments
which are not derivatives, is the cost-based measurement approach in SFAS 65 and SFAS 91
representationally faithful? This issue is narrow in the sense that only a few kinds of business
enterprises make loan commitments. It has potentially broad implications because of the FASB's
commitment to move toward a fair value measurement approach for all financial instruments.

3.0 Applying accounting research to the Conceptual Framework
Across the spectrum of issues on the FASB's agenda, the decisions of the Board and staff of the FASB
are guided by the Conceptual Framework, whose overarching concept is decision usefulness, supported
by relevance, reliability and comparability.(6) Relevance in turn has as subcomponents such concepts as
timeliness, feedback value, and predictive value. Reliability's subcomponents include neutrality,
verifiability, and measurement uncertainty.
With those concepts in mind, I will now turn to where and how accounting research does and does not
provide insights that can or should help the FASB in applying the Conceptual Framework to standard
setting issues. The Conceptual Framework of course contains many elements. To illustrate how
accounting research does and does not provide insights to standard setting decisions, however, it will
suffice to consider just three: neutrality, measurement uncertainty, and decision usefulness.
3.1 Accounting research and neutrality
Neutrality is discussed in Concepts Statement 2, paragraphs 98-110. One way of describing neutral
accounting information is in terms of faithfulness to the underlying economic activity, without regard to
any particular interest, and without shading or coloring presentation for the purpose of influencing
behavior in some particular direction [last four words emphasized in paragraph 100 of Concepts
Statement 2]. Neutrality thus relates to the absence of bias; if a financial reporting standard contains a
bias that is intended to induce (or discourage) some particular behavior, then the standard is not
neutral.(7)
Arguments based directly or indirectly on an alleged lack of neutrality seem to me to be the basis for
claims that some proposed reporting standard will inappropriately discourage some allegedly desirable
activity.(8) Such claims have from time to time led to well publicized disputes about the
appropriateness of a given standard, as, for example, in the FASB's proposal to eliminate the full cost
method of accounting for exploratory oil and gas operations. Should research attempt to provide
insights on neutrality? How successful are such attempts likely to be?
Clearly, if neutrality is an element of the Conceptual Framework, it would be helpful to standard setters
to know the neutrality (or lack of neutrality) characteristics of a given proposal. Given the methods of

social science research, however, I believe that claims about the neutral or non-neutral effects of a given
proposed standard are very difficult or impossible to investigate before the fact. The reason is that
researchers cannot observe the actual effect, in the capital markets, of a proposed standard-researchers
can observe only what people claim they will do, or what they actually do in hypothetical laboratory
settings, where they usually make judgments and/or decisions as individuals and their
judgments/decisions are not aggregated into observable prices.(9)
Even if we were to settle for ex post evidence on what did happen after a given standard was
promulgated, research evidence on neutrality or non-neutrality of a given standard is sparse and often
difficult to interpret. The reason is that any consideration of neutrality requires a comparison of actual
behavior, presumably in response to a given change in reporting rules (or many other shifts, such as
changes in the tax code), with the behavior that would have been observed in the absence of the change.
To take a specific example, related to financial reporting but not related to any specific financial
reporting standard, consider the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act [PSLRA], passed in 1995.
This legislation was explicitly intended to affect behavior. One intended effect of this legislation was to
increase the incidence of forward looking information (that is, forecasts) provided by management, by
providing a safe harbor for forecasts made in good faith with appropriate cautionary language. Critics
charged that the safe harbor might encourage forecasting, but the resulting information would be noisybecause managers would be shielded from litigation over recklessly developed forecasts. So here is the
empirical issue: did the PSLRA influence managers' behavior toward providing more financial
projections? Did the quality of financial projections provided by managers increase or decrease after the
PSLRA?(10)
To answer these questions, the researcher needs to develop a measure which captures something
inherently unobservable, namely, what would have happened to the frequency and quality of forecasts
absent the legislation. To develop a benchmark for this behavior, the researcher must rely on evidence,
usually developed by previous research, about the observable influences on forecasting behavior and
forecast quality. But we all know that it is not possible to develop a perfect measure of the unobservable
behavior that would have occurred in the absence of some actual intervention, so the assessment of
whether tax changes, legislative changes, and financial reporting changes have any behavioral impact,
let alone the intended ones, always requires strong assumptions and compromises with the data, and
almost invariably yields results that must be carefully qualified.
When I say that it is difficult for accounting research to assess neutrality, I do not mean to imply that
researchers should not attempt such assessments. Because assertions related to neutrality, or at least my
interpretation of neutrality, form the basis for some significant political and lobbying interventions in
the standard-setting process, any objective evidence on this issue is of substantial importance. That is, it
would be useful to understand whether there is any evidence to support claims that financial reporting
standards have systematic effects, whether chilling or otherwise, on economically desirable behavior.
3.2 Accounting research and measurement uncertainty
The second concept I want to address in the context of accounting research is measurement uncertainty.
This concept is implied but not explicitly stated in the FASB's Conceptual Framework and is, I believe,
related to the concepts of representational faithfulness and verifiability. I define measurement
uncertainty as the likelihood of error in a reported measure.
I believe measurement uncertainty is of increasing importance in financial reporting because standards
issued by the FASB increasingly require the inclusion of estimates in the preparation of financial
statements and notes. Specifically, reporting standards increasingly require that preparers of financial
statements make judgments and estimates that in turn yield reported numbers that are not directly based
on transactions.(11) Measurement uncertainty increases the possibility that representational faithfulness
is impaired, and can also increase the possibility that comparability is impaired, if measurement

approaches evolve so that economically similar items are not measured the same way.
Researchers who wish to address measurement uncertainty confront a difficult design issue, namely,
what is the benchmark value against which to assess a given candidate measurement approach? After
all, if some objectively superior measure is available to serve as a benchmark, that superior measure can
and should be used in the preparation of financial reports, and calibration is not necessary. In addition,
the researcher also faces the design issue of how to separate the effects of measurement error that is
inherent in the estimation approach or the estimation model from measurement error that represents
managerial manipulations. This separation is important because the two sources of measurement error
have different implications for standard setting.
In the specific case of financial instruments, some objective measures can be and have been used by
researchers to calibrate estimation approaches. If the instruments are traded, the researcher can calibrate
the outcomes of applying various estimation approaches and models against observed market prices,
with a view toward either choosing among various candidate approaches or seeking ways to improve
the performance of some given approach. For example, it is possible to compare observed market prices
of traded bonds with estimated values obtained from applying various valuation approaches. Such a
comparison could be an input into a standard-setting decision about, for example, what kind of
measurement approach to take in separately measuring the liability and equity components of
convertible debt. However, this comparison is not a direct answer to the standard-setting issue, because
the observed market price that forms the benchmark for calibration is for the entire bond and the
standard setter is interested in the measurement error in the separate components, for which separate
market prices are not observed.(12)
3.3 Accounting research and decision usefulness
During the remainder of this presentation, I want to talk about how accounting research has attempted to
operationalize the concept of decision usefulness. This construct sits at the top of the schematic that
captures the basic elements of the FASB's Conceptual Framework, and its two components are
relevance and reliability. Clearly, research that provides evidence on decision usefulness should be of
interest to standard setters. However, the Conceptual Framework does not speak to empirical measures
of decision usefulness, and so researchers have formed their own approaches. I will describe some of
these in turn.
3.3.1 Perceptual data on decision usefulness
First, a researcher might measure decision usefulness as the extent to which users of financial reports
say they use the information in those reports. To gather this information, the researcher might use
surveys, interviews, and focus groups. This approach elicits self-reported perceptions about information
use. Specifically, this measure of decision usefulness is based on how respondents in a survey,
interview, or focus group believe they use the information, or how they they would use a given piece of
information if it were to be provided.
This approach to measuring usefulness is, I believe, the basis for a number of information-gathering
efforts at the FASB and elsewhere. For example, the AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting
used a telephone survey of 1200 users of business reports and convened two discussion groups of
investors and creditors to discuss user perceptions of their information needs.(13) As another example,
PricewaterhouseCoopers has conducted several surveys of sell-side analysts, institutional investors, and
executives (CFOs, heads of investor relations, presidents and CEOs) to ascertain their perceptions of
various alternative performance measures.(14) And the FASB has convened task forces, roundtable
discussions, and other arrangements in which participants provide perception-based information about
information they do (and do not) find useful for decision making.

Research that gathers information on perceptions has, in my view, both strengths and limitations.
Among the strengths are the ability to elicit perceptions about hypothetical information structures. For
example, analysts might be asked to state their beliefs about whether and how they would use the
information that would be reported under some proposed standard. A second strength is the ability to
seek input on narrow and specific questions; for example, analysts might be asked to state their views
on the most decision-useful accounting for loan commitments. On the other hand, there are limitations
to this research as well. The most important limitation, in my opinion, is that perceptions are not
behaviors and perception-based research cannot, by design, capture actual behaviors. Research in
cognitive psychology has shown that people, even experts, are not very good at describing their own
decision-making behavior, and that both perceptions and recalled instances of behavior are often
inaccurate.(15) As a result, the reliability of perceptual data, as a basis for standard setting decisions, is
not clear.
3.3.2 Experimental data on decision usefulness
To get evidence on actual uses of information in making decisions, we need a research approach that is
directed at behavior, and not just perception. Ideally, we'd like evidence on real-world behaviors, that is,
on actual and observable use of accounting information in making some real-world decision. This is a
high hurdle, because in actual markets it is not possible to observe any particular bit of information
being used. So researchers have gone in two directions to document decision usefulness. The first is the
laboratory. In a well-designed experiment, the researcher can be pretty certain what information is being
used to form a judgment or reach a decision because the researcher controls both the task and the
information presented to the experimental participants. He can use conventional research designs to
vary the information conditions facing the participants and connect differences in their judgments and
decisions to differences in the information they are using. For example, a researcher might ask whether
analysts' estimates of intrinsic value are affected by whether Other Comprehensive Income is displayed
as part of the income statement or displayed as part of the Statement of Common Equity -- the idea is
that the income statement display is more salient so analysts are more likely to take account of Other
Comprehensive Income that is displayed this way. In this experimental design, some analysts would be
given the former display and some the latter, with the numbers unchanged across the two display
choices.(16) Differences in estimates of intrinsic value would then be attributable to the difference in
display.
The ability to be relatively certain that information is used and to test how it is used, in experiments,
does not come without cost. Specifically, experiments provide evidence on individual behavior, under
relatively artificial and controlled conditions. Such behavior may or may not extrapolate or generalize to
actual market conditions, which feature much richer information environments and potentially powerful
economic incentives.
3.3.3 Archival data on decision usefulness
Researchers have also attempted to discern evidence of actual information use in naturally occurring
markets, such as the U.S. capital markets. In general this research takes the form of testing for a
statistical association between an information release (such as an earnings announcement press release)
and stock price movements over very short intervals, such as one day. The researcher assumes that the
information in the press release is the dominant source of information for each sample firm on the
release day, and that any other information releases for the sample firms contribute only noise. In most
research this is just an assumption-the researcher does not control or measure the effects of other
information.
In research that investigates the actual use of accounting information in the capital markets, I view as
increasingly problematic the limitations arising from a focus on just one piece of information-usually
the summary earnings number-in an information release (such as an earnings announcement press

release) that contains many pieces of potentially decision-useful information. Both anecdotal evidence
and systematic large-sample evidence demonstrate that earnings announcement press releases have
gotten longer and more complex over time, and are increasingly likely to contain detailed income
statements, discussions of earnings components, and forward looking information. This concurrentlyreleased, non-earnings information has been shown, in other contexts, to convey information to
investors. So when the researcher observes a capital market response to an earnings announcement press
release, it is increasingly likely that the response is associated with both the summary earnings number
and the other information in the press release. This means that ascribing the entire response to the
earnings number may not be appropriate.
I emphasize the importance of considering the entire package of information in the earnings
announcement press release for two reasons. The first reason is the existence of strong statements made
from time to time about dramatic market responses to small earnings surprises. One hears, for example,
that a share price decline of, say, 5 percent or 10 percent or even more is associated with a one-cent
deviation of the reported earnings number from expectations. This statement assumes away all the other
pieces of information in the earnings announcement press release, which could include, for example, an
entire income statement, a management discussion of certain income components, and even some
forward-looking information about future earnings.
The second reason I emphasize the importance of considering the entire package of information in the
earnings announcement press release is the existence of research evidence that indicates that share price
responses to these releases have been increasing over the past 20 or so years. The increases are both
modest in magnitude and, apparently, concentrated among larger firms, but they are statistically reliable
and pervasive across samples and research methods. Given evidence that press releases have
increasingly contained earnings-related information as well as the summary earnings number, it seems
appropriate to investigate the extent to which the documented increase in the apparent decision
usefulness of earnings announcements is due to the inclusion of earnings-related information in the
releases and not the earnings number itself.
In attempting to measure decision usefulness by measuring the one-day stock market response to an
information release, the researcher must not only assume away or control for any effects of other
information releases, he must also find exact dates of information releases. This turns out to be possible
for a surprisingly small set of items, mostly involving earnings announcements in press releases (not
10K or 10Q reports), management forecasts published in press releases, and dated analyst reports. So
this approach to assessing decision usefulness is limited to information for which the researcher can
readily identify the date the information reached investors-and that is not usually the kind of
information that is at issue in a standard-setting decision.
Finally, even for information with identifiable announcement dates, the evidence on one-day
associations between information releases and share price movements often is far too coarse to shed
light on standard-setting issues, whether they are broad or narrow. For example, I cannot conceive of
how to use evidence on associations between share returns and information releases to shed light on the
issue of whether and how to separate compound instruments into their liability and equity components,
or the issue of how to measure the revenue associated with each component of a multiple-deliverable
arrangement.
Perhaps because of design difficulties in carrying out tests of decision usefulness that require precise
identification of information release dates, many researchers have turned to an alternative perspective
on decision usefulness that asks whether a given piece of accounting information, such as earnings, is
associated with, or summarizes, or aggregates the information used by investors to price shares. For
these investigations, it is not necessary to identify an information release date, and the period over
which the association is measured is a choice made as part of the research design. For example, I might
ask if GAAP reported earnings for some year, say 2000, is a good or a poor summary of the information
used to price shares over the year 2000. To answer this question, I would measure the statistical

association between share returns over the entire year 2000 and reported earnings for the year 2000. The
strength of this association would then be used to characterize earnings as either a relatively good or a
relatively poor summary indicator of the information used by investors to price shares. Research that
has carried out these association tests, year by year, over long periods of time has reported that the
earnings number is an increasingly weak summary of the information used to price shares.(17) This
result has been used as the basis for a number of criticisms of the current financial reporting model.
3.3.4. Standard-setting implications of archival research on decision usefulness
From a standard-setting perspective, this finding raises (at least) the following questions. First,
standards speak to much more than the summary earnings number. So we would like to know, how
good is the entire package of information in the financial reports as a summary of the information used
to price shares? That is, evidence that earnings, taken alone, is an increasingly poor summary number
does not speak to the question of the entire information package.
Second, is the decline in the statistical association between earnings and returns partly due to design
choices and the statistics used to capture the association? This question is of course directed at the
technical side of research and does not in and of itself bear at all on standard setting. Third, what is the
role of implementation decisions in determining the strength of reported earnings as a summary of
information? That is, for a given set of accounting standards, to what extent is the ability of earnings to
summarize information used by investors affected by management's implementation decisions? This
third question has implications for earnings management, restatements, quality of earnings, and
estimation errors. Investigations of these and related matters account for a large stream of accounting
research.
Fourth, and of immediate significance to standard setting, to what extent is the apparent decline in the
ability of earnings to summarize information used by investors due to an increasingly poor fit between
reporting standards and the economic environment? Examples of this poor fit, offered by researchers
and others, include the following: most expenditures to develop intangible assets must be expensed; the
balance sheet and income statement reflect a mixed attribute measurement approach, with some items at
fair value and some at acquisition cost; the current display requirements on the income statement do not
provide meaningful categorizations of income components; and the financial reporting model itself is
not appropriate for capturing the true underlying measures of performance, many of which are nonfinancial. Without going into the details of any of these criticisms, I believe it is not useful to attribute
the entire apparent decline in the performance of GAAP earnings as a summary measure of performance
to any of the four possible causes I have listed without also considering the other three possibilities.

4. Examples of accounting research with possible standard-setting implications
At this point, I would like to use two examples to link several of the issues discussed so far. My first
example links perceptions-based research (which asks users of financial statements what information
they believe they use) with archival research that tests for associations between pieces of information
and investor behavior as reflected in share returns. The question to be addressed is: do analysts identify
as preferred valuation measures the same measures investors actually use to value shares? The
perceptions in this example are those of analysts and the behaviors are those of investors as reflected in
share returns.
This example involves first choosing non-earnings performance measures that are favored by analysts.
These choices are based on reading documents prepared by analysts-this is perception-based research
which establishes what analysts say they do. The second step links perceptions with behavior by
comparing the ability of analyst-preferred non-earnings measures to summarize information used by
investors to price shares with the performance of GAAP earnings as a summary measure.(18) Because
non-earnings measures are in general industry specific, I have chosen telecommunications, where

EBITDA(19) is viewed as a superior performance measure, and homebuilding, where order backlog and
new orders are viewed as superior.
Conventional tests which measure whether earnings or the analyst-preferred non-earnings measure has
superior ability to summarize the information actually used by investors to price shares, and whether
earnings and the non-earnings measure add to each other's performance as summary indicators, yield the
following results. In the case of telecommunications, earnings and EBITDA are statistically
indistinguishable in their individual ability to summarize the information in returns, and each adds to
the other in terms of explanatory power. To put this another way, neither EBITDA nor earnings
dominates the other as a summary indicator-even though analyst perceptions would predict EBITDA
dominance. In the case of homebuilding, earnings has greater ability to summarize the information in
returns than new orders and order backlog combined, and the two non-earnings measures, taken
together, do not add much explanatory power in the presence of earnings. In other words, results of
conventional tests indicate that the non-earnings performance measures perceived by analysts to be
superior for valuing homebuilding firms are in fact not at all superior to GAAP earnings.
How can we interpret these results? That is, what if any standard-setting inferences can be drawn from
these findings? I believe there are at least two. First, these findings reinforce the point that perceptions
are not behavior. Analysts may perceive that EBITDA or order backlog or some other measure is
superior to GAAP earnings in assessing firm performance, but this perception may not capture
investors' actual information use, that is, investors' behavior. In my example, analyst perceptions do not
capture investor behavior as reflected in share returns. Based on the statistical associations, earnings
comes as close as EBITDA for capturing the information in returns of telecommunications firms and
earnings is actually better than the proposed non-GAAP performance measures for homebuilders. The
inference I draw is that standard setters should evaluate cautiously statements made by users of financial
statements-such as analysts-about whether and how analysts (or investors) do use the existing
information in financial reports and whether and how they would use some new piece of information if
it were provided.
Second, these findings raise a difficult question of separating relevance from reliability. Association
tests, like the ones I just described, capture combined relevance and reliability of a given information
item in a single statistical measure of the relation between share values and the information item. The
two constructs of relevance and reliability are distinct-something can be relevant without being reliably
measured, and vice versa-but they can rarely be separated in an association test. The possibility exists
that the economic constructs captured by EBITDA for telecommunications firms, and by the
combination of order backlog and new orders for homebuilders, are highly relevant to investors, but
measured with insufficient reliability. That is, measurement error swamps the informativeness in the
construct. It seems reasonable that agreement on a single approach to calculating or measuring a given
performance summary indicator, coupled with the assurance associated with including that indicator in
the audited financial reports, would increase reliability. The inference I draw is that standard setters
should consider the possibility that expanding the current reporting model to provide for comparable
calculation of certain non-GAAP performance measures-especially measures like EBITDA-would
increase the reliability and hence the decision usefulness of those measures.
The second example I want to use to link some of the issues discussed so far involves goodwill arising
from a purchase business combination. In its reconsideration of the accounting for business
combinations, the FASB needed to answer (among others) the following two questions(20):
1. Is purchased goodwill an accounting asset?
2. If goodwill is an asset, does it have an identifiable service life, to be used for amortization purposes?
With regard to the first question, accounting research can provide evidence on whether existing
purchased goodwill appears to be valued by investors in the same way other accounting assets are

valued. And, the answer appears to be, yes, purchased goodwill receives a positive valuation multiple in
a regression of share price on three accounting items: assets excluding goodwill, liabilities, and
purchased goodwill. With regard to the second question, accounting research can provide evidence on
whether amortization expense associated with purchased goodwill appears to be valued by investors as
are other expenses. And, the answer appears to be, no, research did not find evidence that amortization
expense was treated, for valuation purposes, in the same way as other expenses.
What inferences could be drawn from this evidence for standard setting? First, the evidence supports the
treatment of purchased goodwill as an asset, and does not indicate that reliability is substantially
reduced by measuring goodwill as a residual remaining after the purchase consideration is applied to
measure identifiable tangible and intangible assets and liabilities at fair value. Second, the evidence
does not support the amortization treatment of goodwill, which suggests that to the extent goodwill
loses value the loss is not equal, period-by-period, but rather sporadic over time. The inference is that
goodwill should not be amortized; instead, it should be subject to periodic impairment testing.
At this point, however, there are no more standard-setting inferences that can be drawn from the resultswe have reached the practical limits of accounting research. But the standard setter still faces the issue
of describing the approach to be taken to impairment testing. For example, at what level in the
organization should goodwill be tested for impairment? At the segment level? At some organizational
level below the segment level? As another example, what form should the impairment test take?
Because goodwill is a residual number that cannot be separately measured, any test for impairment will
be subject to measurement error. How can that measurement error be reduced to tolerable levels?
This example illustrates, again, an important limitation of accounting research for standard setting: as
the questions become more specific, more narrow, more implementation-oriented and, sometimes, more
measurement-oriented, the ability of accounting research to provide insights disappears. And, to the
extent the questions concern information structures that do not already exist, research which relies on
archival data cannot be used to provide answers because archival data are by definition written records
pertaining to events that have already occurred.

5. Conclusions
To summarize, the FASB uses, or is supposed to use, the Conceptual Framework to guide standard
setting decisions. To the extent the Board's decisions are, however, narrow and implementation-oriented
rather than principles-oriented, the Conceptual Framework may simply not provide operational
guidance. In addition, the Conceptual Framework is incomplete in that only Concepts Statement 7,
Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, focuses on
measurement with any degree of specificity. Finally, the Conceptual Framework appears to be internally
inconsistent with respect to the explicit or implied guidance on revenue recognition in Concepts
Statements 5 and 6.
Accounting researchers can and do provide evidence that is pertinent to the FASB's decisions, to the
extent the research is structured around the Conceptual Framework. There are examples and even
streams of research that address issues related to neutrality, predictive ability, comparability, and
measurement uncertainty. A substantial portion of accounting research focuses on the fundamental
concept of decision usefulness, as operationalized by the concepts of relevance and reliability. Studies
of decision usefulness that use archival data focus on relevance and reliability jointly, because it is for
the most part not possible, using archival data, to separate relevance from reliability. And it is not
possible, in general, to use archival data to shed light on the many narrow implementation-oriented
issues facing the FASB. So, although accounting research can and does provide evidence that can
inform the standard-setting process, the evidence tends to focus on selected aspects of the broadest
elements of decision usefulness. This feature limits the ability of accounting research (and accounting
researchers) to influence the standard-setting process.
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